Kentucky Law Survey: Corporations by Ham, Willburt D.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 68 | Issue 3 Article 2
1980
Kentucky Law Survey: Corporations
Willburt D. Ham
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ham, Willburt D. (1980) "Kentucky Law Survey: Corporations," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 68 : Iss. 3 , Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol68/iss3/2
Corporations
By WILLBURT D. HAM*
In developing the present Survey article, an approach
similar to that used in previous Surveys has been used.' At-
tention will be directed first to a group of cases affecting cor-
poration law at the federal level. These federal developments
will be discussed in the context of two recent decisions by the
United States Supreme Court involving the scope and appli-
cation of the federal securities laws. Also, two decisions by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relating to the elements neces-
sary to state a cause of action under the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5 will be analyzed. This
review will be followed by discussion of a series of cases deal-
ing with corporate principles under state law.
Discussion of state law developments will begin by exam-
ining a decision from the United States Supreme Court relat-
ing to shareholder derivative suits. This commentary will be
followed with a case from the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals dealing with the subject of insider trading under state
law. The Survey will conclude with discussion of a decision by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina concerning shareholder
agreements and with an examination of a decision by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals relating to the maintenance of
suits in the Kentucky courts by foreign corporations that have
failed to qualify to do business in the state.
I. FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW
A. Fraud Against Brokers
During the period covered by the present Survey, the United
States Supreme Court remained active in considering cases in-
volving claimed violations of the federal securities laws. One
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1937, J.D. 1940, University of
Illinois; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
' For previous corporation law surveys, see Ham, Corporations, 67 Ky. L.J. 457
(1978-79); Ham, Corporations, 66 Ky. L.J. 477 (1977-78); Ham, Corporations, 65 Ky.
L.J. 255 (1976-77); Ham, Corporations, 64 Ky. L.J. 253 (1975-76); Ham, Corpora-
tions, 63 Ky. L.J. 739 (1974-75).
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of these cases, United States v. Naftalin,2 concerned a crimi-
nal prosecution brought under section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933,' dealing with fradulent conduct in the offer or
sale of securities.
Naftalin, a professional investor, was charged with partic-
ipating in a fradulent short-selling scheme.4 He had placed
sell orders with several brokers for stocks which he did not
then own but which he thought had peaked in price.' His plan
was to make offsetting purchases of these stocks through
other brokers at lower prices when the market declined as a
means of fulfilling his sales commitments with the first group
of brokers.6 His aim was to profit from the resultant difference
in prices. Since he realized that the first group of brokers
would have refused to execute his sell orders or would have
required margin deposits from him had they known he did not
own the securities, he falsely represented to them that he
owned the shares which were the subject of the sell orders."
As it turned out, the market price of the securities which
Naftalin ordered to be sold rose sharply instead of declining,
and he was unable to make the necessary covering purchases
which would have enabled him to deliver the securities to the
first group of brokers for completion of his sales.9 The brokers
were forced to borrow securities to meet their delivery obliga-
tions and to purchase replacement shares on the open market
at the higher prices to enable them to return the borrowed
2 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
3 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (1976).
4 441 U.S. at 770.
5 Id.
6Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. SEC rule 10a-l(d), promulgated under § 10(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 provides:
No broker or dealer shall mark any order to sell a security registered on, or
admitted to unlisted trading privileges on, a national securities exchange
"long" unless (1) the security to be delivered after sale is carried in the
account for which the sale is to be affected, or (2) such broker or dealer is
informed that the seller owns the security ordered to be sold and, as soon as
is possible without undue inconvenience or expense, will deliver the security
owned to the account for which the sale is to be effected.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-l(d) (1979).
9 441 U.S. at 770-71.
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stock.10
Naftalin was charged in a criminal indictment with fraud-
ulent conduct in violation of paragraph (1) of section 17(a) of
the Securities Act, which condemns the employment of "any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" in the offer or sale of
securities.1 The United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota found Naftalin guilty of the violations charged
and sentenced him to five years imprisonment on each of
eight separate courts, to be served concurrently.1 2 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the convictions
on the ground that Naftalin's fraudulent conduct did not con-
stitute a violation of section 17(a)(1) since the fraud did not
occur in the "offer or sale" of securities as required by that
section.13 The position of the court was that the legislative
purpose in enacting this particular section was "to protect in-
vestors from fraudulent practices in the sale of securities. 1 4
The court reasoned that the brokers with whom Naftalin
placed his sell orders were not themselves purchasers of stock
but were simply acting as agents of Naftalin to find purchas-
10 Id. at 771.
The full text of section 17(a) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
12 See United States v. Naftalin, 579 F.2d 444, 445-46 (8th Cir. 1978). Criminal
sanctions for willful violations of the Securities Act are recognized in § 24 of that Act.
15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976). This section provides that "[a]ny person who willfully violates
any of the provisions of [the Act], or the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission under authority thereof ... shall upon conviction be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id.
13 579 F.2d at 447, 449.
14 Id. At 447.
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ers willing to purchase his stock.15
The Supreme Court granted certiorari16 and, in an opin-
ion by Mr. Justice Brennan, reversed the decision of the court
of appeals.17 The Supreme Court believed that the court of
appeals had given too narrow a construction to the language
of section 17(a)(1)"8 and had adopted too restrictive an inter-
pretation of Congress' intent in enacting the Securities Act of
1933.19 Referring to the need for the fraud to occur "in the
offer or sale" of securities, the Court remarked that "[t]he
statutory terms, which Congress expressly intended to define
broadly ... are expansive enough to encompass the entire
selling process, including the seller/agent transaction."20 In re-
gard to the purpose of Congress in enacting the Securities Act,
while conceding that one of the primary aims was to protect
investors from fraudulent practices in the sale and distribu-
tion of securities,21 the Court pointed to other portions of the
Act's legislative history which it felt showed that an addi-
tional purpose was to protect ethical business practices.22 As
the Court suggested, "the welfare of investors and financial
intermediaries are inextricably linked-frauds perpetrated
upon either business or investors can redound to the detri-
ment of the other and to the economy as a whole. 2
3
15 Id.
16 439 U.S. 1045 (1978).
17 441 U.S. at 771. The other Justices joined in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion
with the exception of Mr. Justice Powell, who did not participate in the consideration
or decision of the case. Id. at 769.
Is Id. at 773.
19 Id. at 774-77.
20 Id. at 773. Section 2(3) of the Securities Act defines the term "sale" as includ-
ing "every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for
value," and defines the term "offer" as including "every attempt or offer to dispose of
• . . a security or interest in a security, for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3). The Court
remarked that "[t]his language does not require that the fraud occur in any particular
phase of the selling transaction. At the very least, an order to a broker to sell securi-
ties is certainly an 'attempt to dispose' of them." 441 U.S. at 773. The Court also
rejected an argument that because subsection (3) of the § 17(a) of the Securities Act
talks about fraud "upon a purchaser" of securities, that phrase should be read into all
three subsections. Id. at 773-74.
21 441 U.S. at 774.
22 Id. at 775-76.
213 Id. at 776. On remand, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the
conviction of Naftalin on the eight separate courts, rejecting Naftalin's argument that
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The Supreme Court's broad and liberal construction of
section 17(a) of the Securities Act may seem somewhat sur-
prising in view of the restrictive interpretations the Court has
regularly given the antifraud provisions of the securities acts
since its decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores.24 The explanation for this apparent aberration no
doubt lies at least in part in the fact that Naftalin involved a
government criminal prosecution, whereas other cases involv-
ing more restrictive interpretations, such as Blue Chip
Stamps, have considered private damage suits which posed
the danger of a widely expanded class of tlaintiffs using the
federal courts. 25 Naftalin therefore may represent only an iso-
lated exception to the otherwise restrictive trend in recent Su-
preme Court decisions. Nevertheless, as one commentator has
pointed out, "rather than being discounted and ignored, Naf-
talin should emerge as a decision that attorneys would do well
to remember, ' 2 for, as he adds, "the decision provides the op-
portunity to rely on contemporary Supreme Court language
when urging a broad interpretation of the federal securities
laws.)2 7
he should have been convicted only on a single scheme to defraud. United States v.
Naftalin, 606 F.2d 809, 810 (8th Cir. 1979). The court pointed out that even though
there might have been a common fraud among Naftalin's sales, "courts have consist-
ently held that each sale of a security may constitute a separate offense." Id.
24 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under
the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977).
25 The Court in Naftalin recognized this distinction when it said: "This case in-
volves a criminal prosecution. The decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores. .. which limited to purchasers or sellers the class of plaintiffs who may have
private implied causes of action under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
10b-5, is therefore inapplicable." 441 U.S. at 774 n.6.
26 Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and
Redington, 68 GEo. L.J. 163, 164 (1979).
27 Id. Another significant development to emerge from the Court's opinion in
Naftalin was the willingness of the Court to recognize the application of § 17(a) of
the Securities Act to conduct in the subsequent trading in securities as well as in the
initial distribution of securities. 441 U.S. at 777-78. This has significance because it
"subjects certain misconduct to the proscriptions and sanctions of both section 17(a)
of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act." Steinberg, supra note
26, at 172.
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B. Fraud by Brokers
In another recent case, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,2
the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether a pri-
vate civil remedy for damages can be implied under section
17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.28 The suit was
brought on behalf of the customers of a securities brokerage
firm against a firm of certified public accountants. These ac-
countants had audited certain financial reports required to be
filed by the brokerage firm under section 17(a); the reports,
however, contained false information."0
The brokerage firm, Weis Securities, Inc., had retained
Touche Ross & Co. to serve as its independent certified public
accountant.31 Touche Ross prepared for Weis the annual
financial condition reports required to be fied with the SEC
under section 17(a), 2 and also prepared responses to financial
questionaires required by the New York Stock Exchange of its
member firms.3 3 Weis became insolvent and was placed in liq-
uidation under the Securities Investor Protection Act.s The
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) and the
trustee in liquidation brought suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York against
28 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
29 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
20 442 U.S. at 562.
31 Id. at 563.
22 The reporting requirement presently is contained in paragraph (a)(1) of § 17,
the relevant portion of which reads as follows:
Every . . . registered broker or dealer ... shall make and keep for
prescribed periods such records, furnish such copies thereof, and make and
disseminate such reports as the Commission, by rule, prescribes as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (1976).
Under SEC rule 17a-5, every registered broker or dealer is required to file an
annual report with the SEC audited by an independent public accountant. The ac-
countant's report is required to state whether the audit was made in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards and whether the accountant reviewed the pro-
cedures followed for safeguarding securities. The rule further requires that there be
attached to the report filed by the broker or dealer an oath or affirmation by the
broker or dealer that to the best of his knowledge the information contained in the
report is true and correct. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1979).
3 442 U.S. at 563-64.
3, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-78m (1976).
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Touche Ross to recover damages. The suit was based on alle-
gations that Touche Ross, due to an improper audit of the
books and records of Weis, had failed to uncover a conspiracy
by the officers of Weis to conceal substantial operating losses
through falsifying the financial reports required to be filed
with the regulatory authorities.3 5 As a result of this dereliction
on the part of Touche Ross, it was claimed that the true
financial condition of Weis did not come to light until too late
to prevent losses to Weis' customers.3 6 The district court dis-
missed the complaint as failing to state a cause of action.37
According to the court, section 17(a) was to be considered as
in the nature of a bookkeeping provision that did not "create
any rights in anybody." 38 The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed, holding that section 17(a) imposes a
duty on accountants which can form the basis for an implied
right of action in favor of a broker-dealer's customers.3 9 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari,40 and, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, declined to accept the court of appeals' po-
sition that a private cause of action could be implied under
section 17(a).41
Basing its opinion primarily on the statutory language of
section 17(a), the Court concluded that there was no reason to
infer that Congress intended to confer rights on private par-
ties through the enactment of section 17(a).42 Rather, as held
35 442 U.S. at 565-66. The trustee sought to recover $51 million for itself and the
customers of Weis. SIPC claimed $14 million either in its own right or by way of
subrogation to claims paid on behalf of the customers of Weis. Id. at 566.
36 Id.
7 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 428 F. Supp. 483, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
' Id. at 489.
' Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978).
40 439 U.S. 979 (1978).
,1 442 U.S. at 567.
42 Id. at 569. The Court has frequently stressed the importance of statutory lan-
guage in cases involving the scope and application of § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act and rule 10b-5 promulgated by the SEC thereunder. See, e.g., Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (rejecting the contention that rule 10b-5
covers internal corporate mismanagement not involving deceptive conduct); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (rejecting mere negligent conduct as suffi-
cient to sustain a cause of action under rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (upholding the purchaser-seller requirement as a prereq-
uisite for standing to sue under rule 10b-5).
1979-1980]
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by the district court, section 17(a) should be considered a re-
cord keeping and reporting provision which, like similar provi-
sions in other statutes, provides the appropriate regulatory
authorities with the information needed by them to police
compliance with the statutes and regulations under their ju-
risdiction.4 As a further justification for refusing to imply a
private remedy under section 17(a), the Court noted the pres-
ence of an express civil liability provision in section 18(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act directed at false and misleading
statements appearing in documents filed with the SEC.4 Al-
though this provision is available only to persons who have
purchased or sold a security at a price which has been affected
by false or misleading statements and therefore could not
have been used by SIPC or the liquidation trustee for the
benefit of the customers of Weis in Redington,4 s the Court re-
fused to accept the argument that a cause of action in favor of
such customers should accordingly be inferred under section
17(a), saying that "we are extremely reluctant to imply a
cause of action in § 17(a) that is significantly broader than the
remedy that Congress chose to provide.14
4" 442 U.S. at 569.
41 Id. at 572.
45 See 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976). Paragraph (a) of this section provides, in part:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any
application, report, or document ified pursuant to this chapter or any rule
or regulation thereunder ... which statement was at the time and in the
light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that
such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such state-
ment, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected
by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person
sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that
such statement was false or misleading....
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
46 442 U.S. at 574. Mr. Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that
a straightforward application of the four factors stressed by the Court in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975) for determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a
statute confirmed the existence of such a cause of action in Redington. The Court in
Cort stated the four factors as follows:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted,". . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff?. Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? .. .Third, is it
1979-19801 SURVEY-CORPORATIONS
The Court's narrow reading of the statutory language in
Redington and the resulting restrictive attitude of the Court
toward inferring a cause of action in favor of private parties
under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act is not sur-
prising in view of the similarly restrictive attitude the Court
has recently displayed in other securities litigation.7 How-
ever, the decision does represent a further retreat from the
more generous attitude regarding private causes of action the
Court had earlier taken in J. L Case Co. v. Borak.'8 In Borak,
the Court readily found a basis for implying a private cause of
action in favor of investors under section 14(a) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act dealing with the regulation of proxy solici-
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff?... And finally, is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
Applying these four factors to Redington, Mr. Justice Marshall concluded that
the brokerage firm customers could be considered the intended beneficiaries of the
regulatory scheme; that there was no indication that Congress intended to restrict the
remedies available under § 17; that a cause of action for damages would be consistent
with the legislative scheme; and that enforcement of the reporting provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act would not be considered a matter of traditional state con-
cern. 442 U.S. at 580-83. In Marshall's view, "implying a private right of action would
both facilitate the SEC's enforcement efforts and provide an incentive for account-
ants to perform their certification functions properly." Id. at 582. In his majority
opinion, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, having found no language in the statute making con-
duct unlawful as to an identifiable class and having found no relevant legislative his-
tory pointing toward an intent on the part of Congress to create a private right of
action, determined the inquiry should stop there without regard to the other two Cort
factors. Id. at 576. In a similar vein, Mr. Justice Brennan, writing a separate concur-
ring opinion, emphasized that "when the plaintiff is not 'one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted,'. . . and when there is also in the legislative
history no 'indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit. . . to create such a
remedy,' . . . the remaining two Cort factors cannot by themselves be a basis for
implying a right of action." Id. at 580 (citations omitted). Mr. Justice Powell took no
part in the consideration of the case. Id.
47 See Lowenfels, supra note 24, at 891-92.
48 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The Court struck another blow at Borak recently when, in
Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979), the
Court, in a 5-4 decision, refused to recognize an implied private action under § 206 of
the Investment Advisers Act, which prohibits fraudulent or deceptive conduct on the
part of investment advisers in their dealings with their clients. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6
(1976).
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tations.49 As to Borak, the Court in Redington said that to the
extent its analysis in Redington differed from that of the
Court in Borak, "it suffices to say that in a series of cases
since Borak we have adhered to a stricter standard for the
implication of private causes of action, and we follow that
stricter standard today."50
C. Materiality
Litigation involving SEC rule 10b-5 continues to flow
through the lower federal courts at a steady pace and cases in
the Sixth Circuit dealing with this rule form no exception.
Two recent cases decided by the Sixth Circuit underscore the
importance of the materiality and scienter elements in rule
10b-5 litigation.
The first of these cases, Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye,5 1 raised
the issue of materiality in the context of a first-option stock
transfer restriction contained in the bylaws of a closely-held
corporation.2 Henry T. Ritter, at the time of his death, owned
143 of the 930 outstanding shares of common stock in Lan-
tana Flower Farms, Inc., a closely-held Florida corporation
engaged in the commercial flower business.5 3 Under Lantana's
49 In Borak, the Court had stressed the language of § 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act which speaks of the Securities and Exchange Commission adopting
such rules and regulations as might be "necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
The Court remarked that "[w]hile this language makes no specific reference to a pri-
vate right of action, among its chief purposes is 'the protection of investors,' which
certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that re-
sult." 377 U.S. at 432.
1o 442 U.S. at 578. As to the outlook for implied rights of action as a result of
Redington and other recent Supreme Court decisions, see generally Steinberg, Im-
plied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAh1n L. 33 (1979).
1 588 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978).
52 Stock transfer restrictions can take a variety of forms and can be framed to
operate in a variety of ways. See 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 7.05 (2d ed. 1971). However, one of the more popular and useful of such re-
strictions is the first-option restriction which gives to the corporation or the other
shareholders in the corporation (or perhaps both) the first opportunity to buy the
shares of a shareholder before the shares are sold or transferred to a third party. Id. §
7.09. The legality of the first-option restriction has generally been upheld as not con-
stituting an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of property. See e.g., Lawson v.
Household Fin. Corp., 152 A. 723 (Del. Ch. 1930).
53 588 F.2d at 203.
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bylaws, Lantana was given the option to purchase the shares
of a deceased shareholder within thirty days after death by
paying the fair market value of the stock as of the end of the
month immediately preceding the exercise of the option."
The bylaws specified that the fair market value was to consist
either of the value agreed upon by the corporation and the
shareholder, or if they were unable to agree upon such value,
the higher of the book value of such shares as shown by the
balance sheet of the corporation or the value determined by
multiplying the average earnings per share for the last three
fiscal years by a factor of ten. 5 Negotiations between plaintiff,
The Toledo Trust Co., as executor of Ritter's estate, and Wil-
liam Nye, president of Lantana, resulted in an offer of $15,000
for Ritter's stock (approximately $104.90 per share) which
plaintiff accepted."6 At the same time these negotiations were
taking place, Nye was consulting with representatives of
United Fruit Co. concerning a possible takeover of Lantana by
United.57 These consultations ultimately led to a sale of all
outstanding Lantana stock to United at a per share price
which was roughly thirty times the per share price which Lan-
tana had previously paid plaintiff for Ritter's shares.5 8 Upon
learning of the United transaction, plaintiff brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Nothern District of
Ohio under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 5 and rule 10b-5,60 seeking damages against Lantana,
Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 204-05.
17 Id. At 205.
58 Id.
9 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest for the protection of
investors.
1979-1980]
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United, Nye, and the other individual shareholders of Lan-
tana.61 The district court held that the defendants had a duty
to disclose to the plaintiff the information they possessed con-
cerning United's takeover at the time of the closing of the op-
tion to purchase Ritter's shares and had violated rule 10b-5
by failing to do so. 62 The court entered a judgment for the
plaintiff in the amount of $407,840.3
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on
the ground that one of the essential elements to a rule 10b-5
claim, that of materiality, was missing in the case." There can
be no liability under rule 10b-5, stated the court, "in the ab-
sence of misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material
fact. ' 65 Pointing to the contractual obligation placed on Lan-
tana under the bylaw option to purchase Ritter's shares at a
price based on fair market value as of the end of the month
immediately preceding the exercise of the option, the court
concluded that the nondisclosed information regarding the
United negotiations could not have been material to the plain-
tiff since "[ult was contractually bound to sell Ritter's shares
to Lantana at an established price as of a certain date, which
date was long before the nondisclosed information even
existed."66
60 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). The full text of the rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
61 Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 426 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
2 Id. at 913.
63 Id. at 915. To this sum the district court added $75,000 for attorney's fees and
expenses as well as interest on both amounts. Id.
64 588 F.2d at 206. The Sixth Circuit also reversed the finding of the district
court that plaintiff's claim could be supported on the basis of common law fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 209.
65 Id. at 206.
66 Id. The court compared a similar result reached by the Eighth Circuit Court
[Vol. 68
SURVEY-CORPORATIONS
In addition to the emphasis placed by the court of ap-
peals in Nye on the element of materiality, the court urged
caution in allowing federal law to interfere with stock restric-
tions contained in the bylaws of closely-held corporations ab-
sent a clear congressional mandate.67 Citing Santa Fe Indus-
tries Inc. v. Green,5 in which the Supreme Court stressed
that rule 10b-5 should not be extended to matters of internal
corporate mismanagement traditionally regulated by state
law,69 the court remarked as to the stock restriction before it
that "[w]hether or not such stock options are 'fair' or wise as
a policy matter is a question of state law which is beyond the
power of this court to determine. 7 0 Accordingly, the court
concluded:
While it appears, in retrospect, that Ritter made a bad bar-
gain, it is not the function of the federal courts to relieve
him of that responsibility. It may be that the fortuity of Rit-
ter's death arbitrarily cut him (or his estate) out of a consid-
erable sum of money, but that is the agreement he made and
there is no federal policy against enforcement of it.71
D. Scienter
The second opinion from the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals to be discussed: Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben,72
involved the question whether allegations of reckless conduct
are sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement enunciated
of Appeals based on lack of reliance instead of lack of materiality. St. Louis Union
Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). The Sixth Circuit chose materiality instead
of reliance as the proper basis on which to decide cases of this kind in view of the
Supreme Court's position in Affiliated Ute Citizens that in cases of nondisclosure
"positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery" in rule 10b-5 cases as
long as the withheld information is material. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). If the nondisclosed information is considered material,
the Sixth Circuit in Nye felt that of the two modes of analysis-materiality and reli-
ance-materiality is preferable in view of Affiliated Ute Citizens. 588 F.2d at 207
n.21.
.7 588 F.2d at 209.
e- 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
e9 Id. at 478-80.
70 588 F.2d at 209.
71 Id. at 210.
7-2 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979).
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by the United States Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder 3 for damage actions brought under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5.
The Supreme Court in Hochfelder rejected the position
that "negligent conduct alone" is sufficient to establish a pri-
vate cause of action for damages under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5,7 "4 and held that no such action could be maintained "in
the absence of any allegation of 'scienter'-intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud. '75 In elaborating on the scienter re-
quirement it was establishing, the Court stated that the term
"scienter" was being used by it to refer to "a mental state em-
bracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. '76 From
this statement, it might have appeared that nothing short of a
specific mental state evidencing evil intent would be sufficient
to satisfy the scienter requirement, but the Court qualified its
statement about "intent to deceive" by conceding that "[i]n
certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form
of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for
some act."'7 7 The court specifically left open "the question
whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient
for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 7 8
The Mansbach case involved allegations by an investor
against a securities brokerage firm charging the firm, through
its agent and employee, with improperly carrying out the in-
structions of the investor as to trading in certain corporate
options.79 The United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky had dismissed this portion of the com-
plaint 0 on the ground that it alleged no more than "negligent
73 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
74 Id. at 214.
75 Id. at 193.
71 Id. at 193 n.12.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 598 F.2d at 1021.
80 The complaint contained three counts. Count I stated the allegations concern-
ing the option transaction. Id. A second count, Count H, related to a complaint by
the investor, Mansbach, as to the refusal of the brokerage firm, Prescott, Ball &
Turben, to return certain corporate bonds which Mansbach had delivered to the firm
as collateral for the anticipated option transactions. Id. The brokerage firm con-
tended that a pledge of corporate bonds was not a "purchase or sale" of securities as
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clerical errors and innocent incompetence" on the part of the
brokerage firm."' Differing with the district court as to the na-
ture of the allegations and finding what it considered to be
allegations of "recklessness and gross negligence, '8 2 the Sixth
Circuit followed the position already adopted in other federal
circuits8 3 that "recklessness is a sufficiently culpable state of
mind for liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."8" In support
of its position the court referred to the acceptance of reckless-
ness as sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement for fraud
at common law, 5 treating the section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
required by § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 so as to give Mansbach standing to sue. Id. at
1028. The lower federal courts are divided over the question whether a pledge can be
considered a "purchase or sale" under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals has taken the position that a pledge can be treated as a "purchase
or sale" within these provisions. See Malis v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 568 F.2d 824
(2d Cir. 1977). On the other hand, the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals
have taken the contrary position. See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038
(7th Cir. 1979); National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295
(5th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court had an opportunity to settle this issue when it
granted certiorari in the Mallis case but lost that opportunity when it reversed its
position and dismissed certiorari on procedural grounds. See Bankers Trust Co. v.
Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, reh. denied, 413 U.S. 915 (1978). Noting the split of authority in
the other federal circuits as to the nature of a pledge, the Sixth Circuit in Mansbach
decided to follow "those cases holding that a pledge is a 'purchase or sale.'" 598 F.2d
at 1028.
81 598 F.2d at 1022.
82 Id. at 1026.
83 See Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2 569, 574 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, reh. denied, 439 U.S. 998 (1978); First Va. Bank-
shares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952
(1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
84 598 F.2d at 1023.
85 A similar analogy was stressed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Rolf
v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978), in which the court said:
It is unquestionable that the common law has served as an interpretive
source of securities law concepts .... The common law tort of fraud has
adopted a recklessness standard as one means of satisfying the requisite
intent element of that cause of action. Similarly, securities law cases have
recognized that recklessness may serve as a surrogate concept for willful
fraud.
Id. at 45-46 (citations omitted). See generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 107, at 700-01 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 526(b), Comment e
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claim as "essentially the federal securities law counterpart to
the common law tort of fraud."86 The court also noted the
problem of proof that would arise if a plaintiff were required
to sustain the burden of showing an "actual subjective intent
to defraud" on the part of the defendant.87 Falling back on
expressions in earlier Supreme Court decisions that section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 should be given a liberal construction in
order to effectuate the underlying policies of the securities
laws, 8 the court concluded that "we should construe the §
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim no more narrowly than required by
Hochfelder. " 9
While the position of the court that section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 are to be given a liberal construction may be open to
question in view of the more recent Supreme Court deci-
sions,90 it does seem reasonable to treat reckless conduct as
within the framework of "intentional" conduct as used by the
Supreme Court in Hochfelder. As Judge Friendly observed in
his concurring opinion in the well-known Texas Gulf Sulphur
case,91 where he was dealing with alleged misstatements ap-
pearing in a corporate press release, there is a difference in
"the award of damages for merely negligent misstatement, as
distinguished from the kind of recklessness that is equivalent
to wilful fraud. '9 2
(1938).
86 598 F.2d at 1024.
87 Id. at 1025. In Roll, the Second Circuit commented on the proof problem that
insistence on an intentional standard of conduct might impose as follows:
A final basis for applying a recklessness standard in certain instances
rests perhaps on the practical problem of proof in private enforcement
under the securities laws. Proof of a defendant's knowledge or intent will
often be inferential ... and cases thus of necessity cast in terms of reck-
lessness. To require in all types of 10b-5 cases that a factfinder must find a
specific intent to deceive or defraud would for all intents and purposes dis-
embowel the private cause of action under § 10(b).
570 F.2d at 47 (citations omitted).
" See e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971)("Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.").
89 598 F.2d at 1024-25.
90 See Whitaker & Rotek, The Supreme Court and the Counter-Revolution in
Securities Regulation, 30 ALA. L. REv. 335 (1979).
91 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969), reh. denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
92 Id. at 868. The commentators also seem to be in general agreement that reck-
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II. STATE CORPORATION LAW
A. Derivative Suits
The proper dichotomy between state and federal law in
the enforcement of the federal securities acts and other fed-
eral legislation has been a continuing problem for the federal
courts. 93 The Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that
corporations are to be considered "creatures of state law,"'4
and that, except where federal law expressly otherwise re-
quires, state law is to govern the internal affairs of the corpo-
ration."' This attitude on the part of the Court was under-
scored recently in the case of Burks v. Lasker.96 In Burks, the
Court considered the question whether a group of disinter-
ested directors of an investment company could terminate a
shareholders' derivative suit brought against other directors of
the company under the Investment Company Act 97 and the
Investment Advisers Act.98
Certain shareholders of Fundamental Investors, Inc., a
registered investment company, brought a derivative suit in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York against several members of its board of directors
and its investment adviser, Anchor Corporation. The suit
charged the defendants with violating their fiduciary duties
lessness should be sufficient to meet the scienter requirement of Hochfelder. See e.g.,
Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977), in which the author stated:
Because the inclusion of recklessness within the definition of scienter would
not greatly expand the group of defendants whose conduct falls within the
ambit of rule 10b-5 culpability, but would significantly increase the chances
of punishing those persons whose conduct, if provable in court, would fall
within any definition of reprehensible securities fraud, the balance between
protecting investors and allowing broad scope to valid commercial activities
must tip in favor of including recklessness.
Id. at 240.
93 See Proceedings, The Airlie House Symposium, An In-Depth Analysis of the
Federal and State Roles in Regulating Corporation Management, 31 Bus. LAw. 861
(Special Issue Feb. 1976).
0' Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
95 Id.
96 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
98 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
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under the Investment Company Act and the Investment Ad-
visers Act in connection with a $20 million investment in
Penn Central Transportation Company commercial paper
prior to the bankruptcy of that company. 9 The board of di-
rectors of Fundamental met to consider the derivative suit
and decided to refer the matter of the company's position re-
garding the suit to the five members of the board who were
neither named as defendants in the suit nor affiliated with the
investment adviser. 100 These five "disinterested" directors
concluded that the prosecution of the action was not in the
best interest of the shareholders of Fundamental and that dis-
missal of the suit should be sought.' 0' The district court took
the position that under the "business judgment rule,"' 02 the
determination of the five independent minority directors
should be respected, so long as they were shown to be truly
independent and disinterested. 03 The court granted discovery
on the issue of independence,0 and after discovery, granted
the motion to dismiss. 105 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the district court, 0 6 finding nothing in the
legislation regulating investment companies to suggest that
disinterested directors of an investment company have power
"to foreclose the continuation of nonfrivolous litigation
"' 441 U.S. at 473, n.3.
100 Id. at 474. There were a total of eleven directors on the board. Five of the
remaining six directors were defendants in the suit and the sixth was a director of
Anchor Corporation, the investment adviser. Id. at 474 n.4.
101 Id. at 474.
102 The "business judgment rule" is a doctrine which has been invoked repeat-
edly by state courts to insulate officers and directors from liability for losses to the
corporation resulting from errors of judgment as opposed to negligent conduct in
managing corporate affairs. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORAUONS § 242 (2d ed. 1970).
"3 Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In support of its result,
the court stated:
In the Court's view, the independent minority of directors had the power to
decide what position the Fund should take. This is consistent with the pol-
icy that a corporation be given the opportunity to control a lawsuit brought
on its behalf, that the Board be allowed to exercise its normal functions in
running the corporation, and that a derivative suit should be resorted to as
a last alternative.
Id. at 1179.
104 Id. at 1180.
o Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Burks v. Lasker, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978).
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brought by shareholders against majority directors for breach
of their fiduciary duties."' °7
Upon certiorari, 108 the Supreme Court disagreed with the
position adopted by the court of appeals. Treating state law as
the source of the powers of corporate directors and consider-
ing the role of federal law to be primarily regulatory in na-
ture, °10  the Court found nothing in the congressional regula-
tion of investment companies to justify "a fiat rule that
directors may never terminate non-frivolous derivative actions
involving co-directors." 1 0 Therefore, according to the Court,
the initial inquiry for a federal court in cases of this kind
should be to determine whether state law permits disinter-
ested directors to terminate derivative suits,," The next in-
quiry would be to determine whether the state rule was con-
sistent with the policies of the Investment Company Act and
the Investment Advisers Act."12 Remanding the case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with its opinion, the Court said:
We hold today that federal courts should apply state
law governing the authority of independent directors to dis-
continue derivative suits to the extent such law is consistent
with the policies of the ICA and IAA. Moreover, we hold
that Congress did not require that States, or federal courts,
absolutely forbid director termination of all nonfrivolous
107 Id. at 1212. The court remarked:
In the ordinary routine of running an investment trust, the disinter-
ested directors must constantly deal with interested directors in a spirit of
accommodation. Indeed, they are compelled for the most part to rely on the
information and expert advice provided by the adviser and the majority
directors. The continued service of the statutorily disinterested directors
... depends almost entirely on the establishment of satisfactory working
arrangements between them and the majority responsible for their selec-
tion. It is asking too much of human nature to expect that the disinterested
directors will view with the necessary objectivity the actions of their col-
leagues in a situation where an adverse decision would be likely to result in
considerable expense and liability for the individuals concerned.
Id.
Jos 439 U.S. 816 (1978).
109 441 U.S. at 478.
110 Id. at 481-82. For a general discussion of the duties possessed by directors of
investment companies( see Radmer, Duties of the Directors of Investment Compa-
nies, 3 J. CoRP. L. 61 (1977).
"1 441 U.S. at 480.
112 Id.
1979-1980]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68
actions.113
Whatever influence this decision may ultimately have on
the attitude of the lower federal courts in future litigation in-
volving the "business judgment rule,"114 it has been suggested
that it may well produce a "cooling trend in the courts with
respect to the rights of private parties who claim to have been
burned in the market place, 11 5 even if it does not constitute
an "instrument of death" for the shareholders' derivative
action. 16
B. Insider Trading
Another aspect of corporation law involving the interrela-
tionship between federal and state law is that involving in-
sider trading by corporate officers and directors in the stock of
their corporation.117 In fact, it was the prevalence of this prac-
113 Id. at 486. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the majority of the
Court. In a separate concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Powell, Mr. Justice
Stewart expressed the view that since both the Investment Company Act and the
Investment Advisers Act are silent on whether a shareholders' derivative suit may be
terminated by disinterested directors, there is no reason to assume that state law will
conflict with federal policy if the applicable state law permits disinterested directors
to do this under the "business judgment rule." Therefore, as he viewed it, on remand
the only issue should be "whether the state law here applicable recognizes this gener-
ally accepted principle and thereby empowers the directors to terminate this stock-
holder suit." Id. at 487. Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the Court's opinion,
rejected the absolutist position expressed by Mr. Justice Stewart, on the ground that
"a situation could very well exist where state law conflicts with federal policy." Id.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration of the case. Id. at 486.
114 For recent applications of the Burks analysis, see Abbey v. Control Data
Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3432 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1980)
(termination of shareholders' derivative action under Delaware business judgment
rule by "Special Litigation Committee" of outside board members did not impinge on
policies underlying the reporting and proxy provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979) (dismissal of shareholders' de-
rivative action by "special litigation committee" of disinterested directors under Cali-
fornia business judgment rule not in conflict with underlying policies of § 10(b) of
Securities Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 or the disclosure requirements relating to
proxy solicitations under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act).
'" SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 530, A-16 (Nov. 28, 1979) (report of panel
discussion at Practicing Law Institute's Eleventh Annual Institute on Securities
Regulation).
I16 Id. at A-18.
117 See Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading,
31 Bus. LAW. 947 (Special Issue Feb. 1976).
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tice that led to the adoption of rule 10b-5 by the Securities
and Exchange Commission in 1942.118 At that time, state law
dealing with insider trading abuses was uneven and unset-
tled.119 Furthermore, such law as did exist related to suits
against officers and directors by shareholders and did not ex-
tend to suits by or on behalf of the corporation to recover
profits made by officers and directors through trading on in-
side information.120
The first recognition of a corporate suit to recover insider
profits under state law came in 1969 in Diamond v.
Oreamuno.121 In that case, the New York Court of Appeals
held that a shareholder's derivative suit could be maintained
on behalf of a corporation to recover profits made by two of
its officers and directors through use of inside information in
selling shares of the corporation's stock owned by them.122
"I See Proceedings, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws,
22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967).
119 The traditional viewpoint, referred to as the majority rule, has been that the
fiduciary obligations of corporate officers and directors run to the corporation and not
to individual shareholders in the corporation. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Danforth, 52
Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868). Some jurisdictions have softened the operation of the
majority rule by requiring disclosure of information to shareholders where "special
facts" exist making it unfair to permit arms-length dealings between corporate offi-
cials and shareholders. The "special facts" doctrine had its origin in Strong v. Repide,
213 U.S. 419 (1909). A few jurisdictions apply a strict fiduciary obligation of disclo-
sure when insiders purchase stock from individual shareholders. See, e.g., Hotchkiss
v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531 (Kan. 1932). See generally 3 L. Loss, SEcutrriEs REGuLAnON
1446-48 (1961).
120 See Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase
Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960).
121 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969). A previous Delaware case, Brophy v. Cities Ser-
vice Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949), had recognized a derivative action on behalf of a
corporation to recover profits made by an employee (confidential secretary to one of
the directors) as the result of trading in the corporation's stock. However, at the time
the employee made his purchases of the corporation's stock, the employee believed
that the corporation was also considering entering the market to make similar
purchases and the case therefore could be considered more in the nature of violation
of the employee's duty of loyalty when trading in competition with the corporation's
planned market activity. See Note, Corporations-Common Law Liabilities for In-
sider Trading, 23 Sw. L.J. 921, 924 (1969). It might also be possible to consider the
employee's trading activity in Brophy as a violation of the corporate opportunity doc-
trine. For a discussion of the corporate opportunity doctrine as it relates to insider
trading, see Slaughter, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 18 Sw. L.J. 96, 107
(1964).
122 The two executive officers possessed information that there was to be a sharp
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Judge Fuld, writing for the court, treated the inside informa-
tion possessed by the defendant directors as in the nature of a
corporate asset which, as fiduciaries, they were not entitled to
appropriate for their own benefit.123
Subsquently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Schein v. Chasen,124 extended the Diamond rule to third par-
ties (tippees) misusing inside information passed on to them
through the president of a Florida based corporation.12 In his
opinion for the court, Judge Waterman looked first to Florida
law, but finding none applicable assumed that the Florida Su-
preme Court, if called upon to decide the question, would fol-
low the lead of Diamond.'26 He said that viewing the case as
the Florida court would probably view it, the "stretch" of Dia-
mond should reach the defendants in the Florida case.1 27 The
decrease in the earnings of the corporation. Before the information was made public,
the officers sold 56,500 shares of the corporation's stock which they owned at the then
current market price of $28 a share. After the announcement of the drop in earnings,
the market price of the stock fell from $28 per share to $11 per share. The officers
thereby made a profit of $800,000 by selling their shares prior to the public an-
nouncement. The suit took the form of a derivative action to have the officers account
to the corporation for this profit. 248 N.E.2d at 911.
123 Id. at 912. Although Judge Fuld's corporate asset theory eliminated the need
for specific allegations of damage to the corporations, he nevertheless suggested that
insider trading could be considered as resulting in harm to the corporation because of
the tarnished public image such insider trading might produce. Id.
124 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973).
121 The allegations in the complaint were that Chasen, the president and chief
operating officer of Lum's Inc., had informed Simon, a stockbroker employed by Leh-
man Brothers, of an anticipated drop in the earnings of Lum's. It was charged that
Simon then had passed the information on to the portfolio managers of two mutual
funds who in turn directed the funds to sell their entire stockholdings in LuM's. By
selling the Lum's shares before the earnings information was made public, it was
claimed that the funds received $3.50 per share more for the stock than they other-
wise would have received. Id. at 819-21. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York had dismissed the suit as to the third party defen-
dants on the ground that the Diamond holding did not extend beyond corporate offi-
cials to third parties. Gildenhorn v. Lum's, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329, 334 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). For further background to the Lum's litigation, see SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
126 478 F.2d at 821.
121 Id. at 822. Treating Lehman Brothers and the mutual funds as co-venturers
with Schein in his breach of duty, Judge Waterman said:
Moreover, in the light of the corporate interest which the Diamond rule is
designed to protect, it is immaterial to the preservation of that interest
whether the director trades on his own account in the corporation's stock or
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defendants sought review of the Second Circuit decision by
the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the ap-
pellate court should have availed itself of the Florida certifica-
tion procedure and submitted the question to the Florida Su-
preme Court for a definitive ruling.128 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the certification issue,129
and in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, remanded the case
to the court of appeals for reconsideration of the question
whether the state law issue should have been certified to the
Florida Supreme Court.130 On remand, the issue of third party
whether he passes on the information to outsiders who then trade in the
corporation's stock. In either event, so long as the director is involved, the
prestige and good will of the corporation may be tarnished by the public
revelation that the director has been involved in unethical conduct....
Accordingly, it would be self-defeating to limit the reach of Diamond to
directors and officers of the injured corporation who have so acted while
permitting third-party co-venturers of theirs to escape liability to the
corporation.
Id. at 822-23.
,28 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1974). The Florida certified question stat-
ute provides:
The supreme court of this state may, by rule of court, provide that,
when it shall appear to the supreme court of the United States, to any cir-
cuit court of appeals of the United States, or to the court of appeals of the
District of Columbia, that there are involved in any proceeding before it
questions or propositions of the laws of this state, which are determinative
of the said cause, and there are no clear controlling precedents in the deci-
sions of the supreme court of this state, such federal appellate court may
certify such questions or propositions of the laws of this state to the su-
preme court of this state for instructions concerning such questions or pro-
positions of state law, which certificate the supreme court of this state, by
written opinion, may answer.
The Supreme Court of Florida has implemented this statutory authority by
adoption of FLA. App. R. 4.61. The Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted a similar
certification rule for Kentucky, effective September 1, 1978. See Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.37.
In his dissenting opinion in Schein v. Chasen, Judge Kaufman questioned the desira-
bility of deciding a novel question of Florida state law without giving the Florida
Supreme Court an opportunity to provide an authoritative answer under the Florida
certification procedure. 478 F.2d at 828-29.
129 Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973).
130 Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974). After noting that resort to
the certification procedure was not obligatory, Mr. Justice Douglas commented as to
the situation in Schein:
Here resort to it would seem particularly appropriate in view of the
novelty of the question and the great unsettlement of Florida law, Florida
being a distant State. When federal judges in New York attempt to predict
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liability for trading on inside information was submitted by
the court of appeals to the Florida Supreme Court, which an-
swered by rejecting both the Diamond rule and its expansion
to cover third parties. s3
This rejection of Diamond was reinforced by a recent de-
cision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Freeman v.
Decio,13 2 applying Indiana law. After an extensive review of
the Diamond opinion, which it characterized as an example of
"judicial securities regulation, 133 and an analysis of the ex-
isting Indiana law on insider trading,1 34 the court concluded
uncertain Florida law, they act, as we have referred to ourselves on this
Court in matters of state law, as "outsiders" lacking the common exposure
to local law which comes from sitting in the jurisdiction.
Id. at 391.
131 Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1975). In rejecting Judge Waterman's
reasoning in the Second Circuit opinion, the Florida Supreme Court said:
Not only will we not give the unprecedented expansive reading to Diamond
sought by appellants but furthermore, we do not choose to adopt the inno-
vative ruling of the New York Court of Appeals in Diamond .... We ad-
here to previous precedent established by the courts in this state that ac-
tual damage to the corporation must be alleged in the complaint to
substantiate a stockholders' derivative action.
Id. at 746.
Judge Kaufman had foreshadowed the result reached by the Florida Supreme
Court in his dissenting opinion in Schein when the case was first before the Second
Circuit. Disagreeing with Judge Waterman, he questioned liability "founded on the
conclusion of two federal judges that the Florida Supreme Court, if the instant case
was before it, would look to a New York decision and, in addition, would give an
unprecedented expansive reading to that case." 478 F.2d at 828.
On return of the case, the Second Circuit affirmed the original decision of the
district court dismissing the suit. Schein v. Chasen, 519 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1975) (per
curiam).
132 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978). The suit was brought by Freeman, a shareholder
in Skyline Corporation, against Decio, chairman of the board of directors of Skyline,
and other directors of the corporation, charging that they had sold Skyline stock on
the basis of material inside information. One of the charges covered sales made dur-
ing fiscal quarters ending May 31, 1972, and August 31, 1972, when it was claimed the
financial reports for those periods understated material costs and overstated earnings.
A second charge claimed that during the quarter ending November 30, 1972, and up
to December 22, 1972, Decio and another director made sales of Skyline stock with
knowledge that reported earnings for the November 30 quarter would decline. Id. at
187.
... Id. at 196.
134 Noting the Indiana Supreme Court holding in Board of Comm'rs of Tippeca-
noe Co. v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873), that a director owes no fiduciary duty to a
shareholder in buying his stock, the court remarked that "it seems somewhat unlikely
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that "were the issue to be presented to the Indiana courts at
the present time, they would most likely join the Florida Su-
preme Court in refusing to adopt the New York Court's inno-
vative ruling. ' '135
Thus, despite Judge Fuld's observation in Diamond that
"[t]he primary source of the law in this area ever remains that
of the State which created the corporation,"13' if the Florida
attitude toward corporate recovery of insider trading profits
under state law should prevail, state law will have lost an op-
portunity to assume a more dominant role in policy insider
trading activity.13 7 Furthermore, any such failure by state law
to assume such a role could leave an unfortunate gap in the
law pertaining to insider trading since such corporate suits at
the federal level would appear limited to the recovery of
short-swing profits under section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act.138 It is true the SEC has been successful in bring-
ing about the disgorgement of profits as ancillary relief in in-
that a common law jurisdiction not directly protecting a selling shareholder from in-
sider trading would go on to create a cause of action in favor of the corporation." 584
F.2d at 196. For a commentary on Indiana law as reflected in Reynolds, suggesting
that in view of "[t]he realities of modem business practices," that case "should be
overruled," see Ryan, Should Tippecanoe County Comm'rs v. Reynolds Be Over-
ruled? 16 IND. L.J. 563, 574 (1941).
"1 584 F.2d at 196. As an alternative ground for its decision, the court agreed
with the district court that there was no factual basis for the plaintiff's claim. Id. at
196-200. The court also indicated that had they not agreed with the district court's
conclusion that there was no factual basis for plaintiff's allegations of insider trading,
they would have seriously considered use of the Indiana certified question statute. Id.
at 189 n.8.
136 248 N.E.2d at 915.
2'7 Although there has been some discussion among commentators as to the cost-
efficiency of attempting to police insider trading, the general consensus seems to be in
favor of discouraging such activity. See W. PLAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF IN-
SIDER TRADING (1968). This attitude was reflected by Judge Waterman in Schein v.
Chasen when he spoke of the desirability of "tightening the law of insider trading"
and the "prophylactic effect" that Diamond had in "providing a disincentive to in-
sider trading." 478 F.2d at 823.
138 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). Under the provisions of this section a suit can be
brought by or on behalf of a corporation to recover profits realized by a director,
officer, or beneficial owner of the corporation's stock, resulting from a purchase and
sale, or sale and purchase, of the corporation's stock within a period of six months.
Id. A beneficial owner is defined as any person who is directly or indirectly the bene-
ficial owner of more than 10% of any class of equity security issued by the corpora-
tion. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976).
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junctive suits under rule 10b-5,139 but it is no doubt
unrealistic to assume that the Commission will seek such re-
lief in every case in which it discovers illegal insider trading
activity. 140 Corporate suits of this kind under rule 10b-5 also
appear precluded because of the purchser-seller standing re-
quirement imposed on rule 10b-5 plaintiffs by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Blue Chip Stamps case. 141
Accordingly, as Judge Fuld suggested in upholding corpo-
rate recovery in Diamond, "[t]here is ample room in a situa-
tion such as here presented for a 'private Attorney General' to
come forward and enforce proper behavior on the part of cor-
porate officials through the medium of the derivative action
brought in the name of the corporation.' ' 42 For, as he said,
"[o]nly by sanctioning such a cause of action will there be any
effective method to prevent the type of abuse of corporate of-
fice complained of [in cases like Diamond]."'43
C. Shareholder Agreements
Turning to more traditional areas of state corporation
law, a recent decision by the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina, Blount v. Taft,14 illustrates the possible ramifications of
agreements among shareholders of a closely-held corporation
relating to the structure and management of the business
when the agreement is reflected in the charter or bylaws of
the corporation. 45
In Blount, the shareholders, representing three family
factions (the Blounts, the Tafts, and the McGowans), unani-
139 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub
nom Holyk v. SEC, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
140 See Ratner, supra note 117, at 954.
'41 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
42 248 N.E.2d at 915.
143 Id. The individual suit by private investors damaged in face-to-face dealings
as the result of insider trading is, of course, still available at the federal level under
rule 10b-5, but the availability of similar suits by private investors where the trading
has occurred on the anonymous public market remains in doubt. Compare Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), with
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
144 246 S.E.2d 763 (N.C. 1978).
145 See 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONs: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.79 (2d ed.
1971).
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mously adopted a set of bylaws which provided that the board
of directors could, by majority vote, designate an executive
committee consisting of one member from each of the three
families. 146 It was further provided that the executive commit-
tee so appointed should have the exclusive authority by unan-
imous vote to select the employees of the corporation.147 Sev-
eral years later, as a result of family differences, the board of
directors through majority vote, as provided by the bylaws,
amended the bylaws so as to delete these provisions. 14 A new
bylaw was adopted providing for appointment by a majority
of the board of directors of an executive committee composed
of two or more directors. 149 A new executive committee was
appointed pursuant to this provision consisting of three mem-
bers who represented each of the family factions.150 One of the
family groups (the Blounts) which was at odds with the other
two family groups (the Taft and McGowan families) objected
146 246 S.E.2d at 766. This particular bylaw, which constituted § 7 of Article III
of the bylaws, read, in part:
Executive Committee. The Board of Directors may, by the vote of a
majority of the entire board, designate three or more directors to constitute
and serve as an Executive Committee, which committee to the extent pro-
vided in such resolution, shall have and may exercise all of the authority of
the Board of Directors in the management of the corporation. Such com-
mittee shall consist of one member from the family of M.K. Blount, Sr., one
member from the family of E.H. Taft, Jr., and one member from the family
of Ford McGowan. Minutes of all such meetings shall be kept and a copy
mailed to each member of the Board of Directors and action of the commit-
tee shall be submitted to the Board of Directors at its next meeting for
ratification....
Id.
I "1 Id. This portion of § 7 of the bylaws provided: "The Executive Committee
shall have the exclusive authority to employ all persons who shall work for the corpo-
ration and that the employment of each individual shall be only after the unamimous
consent of the committee and after interview." Id.
148 Id. at 767.
149 Id. at 768. Section 7 of the bylaws was replaced by a new § 9, which read:
9. Executive Committee: The Board of Directors may, by resolution
adopted by a majority of the number of directors fixed by resolution under
these bylaws, designate two or more directors to constitute an Executive
Committee, which Committee, to the extent provided in such resolution,
shall have and may exercise all of the authority of the Board of Directors in
the management of the corporation.
1ro Id.
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to changing the old bylaws 1 and brought suit to enforce the
original shareholders' agreement contained in the old by-
laws.152 The trial judge held that the former bylaw provision
relating to the appointment and powers of an executive com-
mittee constituted a valid and binding shareholders' agree-
ment under the North Carolina Business Corporation Act,1
0 3
which could not be amended or repealed except by unanimous
consent of all the shareholders. 54 He therefore ordered spe-
cific enforcement of the bylaw provisions.151
Reversing the trial judge's decision, the court of appeals
found nothing to support the conclusion that the bylaw provi-
sion pertaining to executive committees could not be amended
in the same manner as other bylaws of the corporation. " On
appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the court af-
firmed the decision of the court of appeals.10 7 The state su-
preme court took the position that since the shareholders'
agreement concerning executive committees and the employ-
ment of corporate personnel was only one of a complete set of
bylaws adopted at the same time by all the shareholders, it
should be considered as subject to change or repeal in the
same manner as any of the other bylaws unless provided oth-
erwise.158 The court conceded that had the bylaw been merely
"a 'side agreement' signed by all the stockholders, and not
been made a part of the bylaws, it is plausible to argue that
absent an internal provision governing its amendment it could
be amended only by unanimous consent of all the stockhold-
ers."1 59 Since, however, it took the form of a bylaw, the court
reasoned that it was "subject to amendment by the directors
,'l Id. at 767. The Blount faction protested that the new bylaws were an effort
on the part of the majority shareholders, particularly the Taft family, to change the
bylaws to suit the interests of that family. The Taft faction countered that the bylaws
were being changed because of the lack of cooperation by the Blount family in the
conduct of the business. Id.
112 Id. at 764.
153 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1975).
:" 246 S.E.2d at 768.
55 Id.
151 Blount v. Taft, 225 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
157 246 S.E.2d at 773.
,58 Id. at 771.
259 Id. at 772.
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or shareholders according to the procedures applicable to the
other bylaws."1 0 Accordingly, concluded the court, "[w]e hold
.. .that if a shareholders' agreement is made a part of the
charter or bylaws it will be subject to amendment as provided
therein or, in the absence of an internal provision governing
amendments, as provided by the statutory norms."161
This decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court illus-
trates the care that must be exercised in formulating share-
holder agreements relating to the government of closely-held
corporations. 62 If any such arrangements are to become a part
of the internal structure of the corporation embodied in the
charter or bylaws of the corporation, consideration should be
given to the inclusion of special provisions prohibiting amend-
ments without the consent of all participants in the arrange-
ment.163 Otherwise, minority interests may be exposed, as in
Blount, to risks which they may not have contemplated.""
D. Foreign Corporations
Finally, a case from the Kentucky Court of Appeals, Ab-
bott v. Southern Subaru Star, Inc.,165 underscores the signifi-
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 For a discussion of matters which may be covered by a shareholders' agree-
ment, see 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORArIONs: LAW AND PRACcE § 5.02 (2d ed. 1971).
163 Id. § 3.78.
164 For a more extensive analysis of the Blount decision and its ramifications for
shareholders in close corporations, see Note, Close Corporations-The Amendment
of Shareholder Agreements in North Carolina-Blount v. Taft, 15 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 531 (1979).
161 574 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). For other recent Kentucky cases of in-
terest decided by the court of appeals, see White v. Winchester Land Dev. Corp., 584
S.W.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)(where formalities of corporate existence had been ob-
served and creditor had knowledge of financial status of corporation there was no
reason to pierce corporate veil); American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Ostertag, 582
S.W.2d 51 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)(existence of common directorships and joint credit
agreements between parent and subsidiary corporations was not enough to warrant
piercing the corporate veil); Simpson v. Heath & Co., 580 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979)(president of corporation who signed agreement as guarantor of corporate con-
tract which he executed as president of corporation was not individually liable on
guaranty as a matter of law when he appended to his signature on the guaranty the
letters "Pres."); Hutto v. Bockweg, 579 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (three-year
statute of limitations in Kentucky Securities Act for actions based on securities fraud
not unconstitutional as special legislation because of presence of a five-year statute of
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cance of the foreign corporation provisions in state corpora-
tion statutes."6 These provisions customarily require foreign
corporations to take certain steps to qualify themselves to
transact business in the state and prescribe certain penalties
should those companies fail to do so. 167
Under the Kentucky Business Corporation Act,68 the ba-
sic requirement is that a foreign corporation wishing to trans-
act intrastate business must procure a "certificate of author-
ity" from the Secretary of State.168 Application for such a
certificate of authority must be made on forms prescribed and
furnished by the Secretary of State containing specified infor-
mation about the corporation and its business.1 70 Duplicate
originals of the application must be delivered to the Secretary
of State, together with a copy of the corporation's articles of
incorporation which have been duly authenticated by the
proper officer of the state or country of incorporation."" If the
Secretary of State finds that the application meets the neces-
sary requirements, he issues a certificate of authority upon
payment of the prescribed fees.172 The basic penalty imposed
on a foreign corporation which fails to secure the required cer-
tificate of authority before transacting business in the state is
denial of the corporation's right to maintain any suit in the
courts of the state until it has obtained the certificate of
authority. 17 3
limitations for general actions based on fraud).
"I The term "foreign corporation" is used to refer to corporations organized in
another state or country. See, for example, the definition of "foreign corporation"
contained in the Kentucky Business Corporation Act. Ky. REV. STAT. §
271A.010(2)(Supp. 1978)[hereinafter cited as KRS]. The term is there defined to
mean "a corporation for profit organized under the laws other than the laws of this
state for a purpose or purposes for which a corporation may be organized under this
chapter." Id.
'67 See H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 100 (2d ed. 1970).
188 KRS § 271A.010-.710 (Supp. 1978). The foreign corporation provisions of the
Kentucky Business Corporation Act are derived from the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, which Kentucky adopted in substantial part in 1972. See Ham, Kentucky
Adopts a New Business Corporation Act, 61 Ky. L.J. 73 (1972).
-69 KRS § 271A.520 (Supp. 1978).
170 KRS § 271A.540 (Supp. 1978).
171 KRS § 271A.545(1)(Supp. 1978).
172 Id. at (2).
173 KRS § 271A.610(1)(Supp. 1978). The Kentucky statute supplements this gen-
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In Abbott, Southern Subaru Star, Inc., a Texas corpora-
tion, and Bug's Distributors, Inc., a Kentucky corporation,
held distributorship agreements with an importing firm,
Subaru of America, Inc., for the sale of automobiles to retail
dealers in several southern states.17 ' The corporations decided
to enter into joint venture for this purpose and formed a sepa-
rate corporation under Kentucky law, Subaru of the South,
Inc., which became the distributor of the vehicles.17 5 Bug's
owned fifty-one percent of the stock in South, with Star own-
ing the remainder.176 Abbott became the chief operating of-
ficer of South and as such managed its affairs. 17 7 Later, when
the business deteriorated, Star filed a complaint in circuit
court charging Abbott and Bug's, which Abbott controlled,
with converting funds from South.1 78 When the defendants
failed to comply with various court orders, including an order
to file a pretrial memorandum, the court entered a default
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.179 As a subsequent hearing
ordered by the court on the issue of damages, the defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
eral sanction by providing that before the corporation can use the courts of the state,
the corporation must have, in addition to obtaining a certificate of authority, (a) paid
to the Secretary of State a forfeiture of $250, (b) furnished the Secretary of State
with information as to the time the corporation began to transact business in the
state, (c) obtained from the Secretary of State a certificate that the corporation has
paid all fees which would have been imposed on the corporation had it duly applied
for and received a certificate of authority, and (d) filed with the Secretary of State a
certificate from the Commissioner of Revenue that the corporation has paid all in-
come and license taxes owed to the state. Id. at (2). This additional provision,
modeled after a similar Ohio statute, was included to discourage deliberate violations
of Kentucky law by foreign corporations at the expense of locally incorporated busi-
nesses. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1703.29 (Page 1978).
There are also criminal penalties imposed on corporations and their officers and
directors for violating the provisions of the Kentucky Business Corporation Act. See
KRS § 271A.640 (Supp. 1978). It is provided that any foreign corporation which
transacts business in the state without complying with the provisions of the statute,
and any officer, director or agent of the corporation who knowingly participates in
such unauthorized business is subject to a fine for each offense of not less than $100
nor more than $1,000. Id. at (1).
174 574 S.W.2d at 685.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
170 Id.
179 Id. at 686-87.
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plaintiff had failed to qualify to transact business in Kentucky
and thus was precluded from maintaining suit in the Ken-
tucky courts.180 The court overruled this motion.181 On appeal,
the court of appeals affirmed the action taken by the trial
court in overruling the motion to dismiss, 82 pointing out that
under the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, the capacity of
a party to sue is a matter of defense which must be pleaded
by "specific negative averment,"' 83 and "failure to so plead
specifically is a waiver of that defense."'81 4
Thus, not only must foreign corporations be attentive to
the required qualification procedures when they do business
in states other than their state of incorporation, but, as the
Abbott case teaches, counsel representing clients in the "qual-
ifying" states must be alert to the procedural requirements for
raising the lack of qualification of such corporations on behalf
of their clients. 8 5 As the court of appeals noted in Abbott, the
statutory provisions relating to qualification do not pertain to
jurisdiction but to capacity to sue.' This is because "jurisdic-
tion refers to the power of a court to hear and determine the
subject matter of the litigation while capacity deals with the
ability of a party to participate in that litigation.' 87
180 Id. at 687.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 688.
263 Ky. R. Civ. P. 9.01. This rule provides in part: "When a party desires to raise
an issue as to. . . the capacity of any party to sue. . . he shall do so by specific
negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly
within the pleader's knowledge." Id.
18 574 S.W.2d at 687.
188 The majority rule is that a defense based on the failure of a foreign corpora-
tion to comply with conditions precedent to its right to do business in the state must
be specially pleaded, and that a general denial in the answer is insufficient. See 18 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8622 (rev. perm. ed.
1977).
188 574 S.W.2d at 688.
187 Id. An underlying issue not before the court, but to which the court alluded,
was whether a foreign corporation can be denied a right to sue in the courts of the
state for tortious injury to its property (such as through conversion) where it has
failed to comply with the requirements for doing business in the state. Id. Although
the Kentucky statutory provisions denying access to the courts by such a foreign cor-
poration cover "any action, suit or proceeding," the court recognized that there might
be a constitutional problem if this language were to be interpreted to preclude use of
the courts by the corporation to recover for tortious injuries. See Ky. CONST. § 14.
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This provision states that "[a]l courts shall be open and every person, for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay." Id. See Bor-
derland Coal Sales Co. v. Walker, 270 S.W. 717 (Ky. 1925). See generally 18A W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 8795, 8796 (rev.
perm. ed. 1977).
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